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ReseaRch and RepoRts
assessing employment tribunal awards
1. IntroductIon
Employment Tribunals have been under scrutiny for many years and the focus 
during that time has been on cost. IFF Research1 conducted a study on this topic, 
entitled Payment of Tribunal Awards, for the Department of Business Innovation 
and Skills (BIS).2 Released in late 2013, this report provided data reflecting on the 
employment law reforms passed by the Coalition Government, particularly the pro-
cedure for dispute resolution. Payment of Tribunal Awards both corroborated and 
brought into question portions of recent legislative changes.
A. Study Parameters
The sample size consisted of 2,493 claimants in England, Wales and Scotland whose 
applications were successful (either through a Tribunal hearing or by default judg-
ment) between September 2011 and November 2012. This group was drawn from a 
sample frame of 4,891 supplied by Her Majesty’s Court and Tribunal Service. One 
thousand two hundred interviews were conducted between 13 May and 13 June 2013 
(1,000 in England and Wales; 200 in Scotland).
2. PAyment of AwArdS
The adjectives ‘vulnerable’ and ‘precarious’ have been used to describe categories of 
workers. The IFF study does not suggest these are misplaced. Those making claims 
are most likely (59%) to earn £40,000 or less; only 5% of claimants earned over this 
amount.3 There was also a noteworthy finding in the report: ‘Those who had been 
1 IFF describes itself as ‘a full service agency – one of the largest independent research com-
panies in the UK. Established in 1965, [it] conduct[s] high quality strategic research for a wide 
range of private and public sector clients’: www.iffresearch.com.
2 IFF Research, Payment of Tribunal Awards (London: BIS, 2013)  [Payment of Tribunal 
Awards].
3 Ibid. 15.
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in part-time work prior to filing their claim were less likely to still be in work, with 
47% in part-time and 22% in full-time positions, 17% were unemployed, 2% self-
employed and 12% not working or looking for work’.4 The median value of awards 
obtained was £2,600.5 The study found that 49% of those seeking £5,000 or more 
were in the managerial, professional or associate cohort.
The report highlighted some points requiring continued attention. Twenty-six per-
cent of those claiming a breach of contract were aged 55 and over.6 This cohort was 
also most likely to make a claim based on redundancy and consultation (33%). As 
well, the number of claims for wages grew since 2008. Forty percent of those making 
wage claims had worked for an employer for 1 year or less. Twenty-five percent of 
those making wage claims were under the age of 30.7
A. non-payment
The figures regarding employers’ refusal to pay revealed a version of competitive-
ness. As acknowledgement of the importance placed on employing entities, the UK 
is regulated with an emphasis on businesses’ competitiveness. Almost a third of 
employers refused to pay when tribunals made awards. Businesses were more likely 
to refuse to pay awards below £5,000 than above (32% as compared with 22%).8 
The figure is high considering that qualification for unfair dismissal was extended to 
2 years when 8% of such claims were successful.
The most common reason for non-payment was an employer who had become 
insolvent (37%).9 About half of these respondents believed that their former 
employers were carrying on business under a different name. Twenty-nine percent 
of claimants stated that the employer refused to pay and 17% were unable to locate 
the employer. The amount of the award factored in those with awards over £5,000 
were more likely to report the employer had become insolvent or ceased trading 
(46% versus 35% for those with awards below £5,000).
B. Payment without enforcement
Employers were most likely to pay claims (either fully or partially) for unfair dis-
missal (61%) without enforcement. Targeting of unfair dismissal as an area for 
4 Ibid. 16.
5 Ibid. 22. This finding supports Judge David Latham’s (the out-going President of the 
Employment Tribunal of England and Wales) statement in the Senior President of Tribunals’ 
Annual Report 2014 (London: 2014) [Senior President Report], 66: ‘There is a misconception in the 
political and the business world that high awards are a common feature of Employment Tribunals’.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. 22.
8 Ibid. 38.
9 Payment of Tribunal Awards, 37.
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legislative change has been previously criticised.10 While this study does not con-
firm anything, it does nothing to undercut continued reproach. Awards under £500 
were most likely to be paid without enforcement (55%).11 Awards over £5,000 were 
slightly more likely to be at least partially paid without enforcement (58%) as com-
pared to awards under £5,000 (50%). The study’s authors attributed the difference 
to partial payment.12 Factors increasing the likelihood of payment without enforce-
ment included length of service with the employer13 and assistance from lawyers.14
IFF noted that 64% of those who received help from family or friends obtained 
payment without enforcement.15 Though difficult to draw conclusions, this remained a 
significant finding. It may be that cost has taken legal services out of the reach of many 
considering the value of the awards. Nevertheless, an increase in the numbers of those 
who are unaware of their options (discussed below) is foreseeable. As well, those who 
sought assistance from the Citizens’ Advice Bureau were almost as likely to obtain any 
payment without enforcement as those who had no assistance (47% versus 48%).16
c. Payment by enforcement
Enforcement is effective insofar as it increases the overall payment rate from 53% to 
64% of claimants receiving full or partial payment of their awards. There is a nota-
ble absence of knowledge amongst claimants: less than half of those surveyed were 
aware of enforcement options (41%). In England and Wales, 48% of unpaid claim-
ants pursued enforcement action, the same figure as in 2008.17 The study also deter-
mined that if Government sources were not factored in ‘the proportion of awards 
that [were] honoured by the employer against which they [were] made would be 
even lower’.18 It may be that educating workers as to their rights would seem to be 
contrary to the goals of reducing costs for employers.19 Viewed in this (cynical) man-
ner, the absence of change in enforcement action is a desired outcome.
10 K. Ewing and J. Hendy, ‘Unfair Dismissal Law Changes--Unfair?’ (2012) 41 ILJ 115–21.
11 Payment of Tribunal Awards, 31.
12 Seventeen percent of the awards over £5,000 had been at least partially paid as compared 
with 8% of those under £5,000: Ibid. 31.
13 Twenty-nine percent who were fully or partially paid had worked for a year or less. The 
figure rose to 52% for those between 2 and 5 years of service and 72% for those in service for 
over 5 years.
14 Sixty-one percent of those receiving payment without enforcement used the services of a 
lawyer: Payment of Tribunal Awards, 33.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. 34.
17 Ibid. 39.
18 Ibid. 48.
19 Knowledge of rights leads to increased resort to employment tribunals: A. Pollert, ‘The 
Unorganised Worker: The Decline in Collectivism and New Hurdles to Individual Employment 
Rights’ (2005) 34 ILJ 217–38, at p 220.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ilj/article-abstract/43/2/212/2724344 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 August 2019
215
July 2014 Assessing employment tribunal Awards
3. dAtA rAISIng QueStIonS regArdIng reform PremISeS
A. Vexatious Litigants
This report offers an important opportunity for analysis of the claims levied in 
the lead up to recent reforms. The common criticism of those who have opposed 
employment regulation has been the perceived industry of litigation against 
employers. These critics cite the need to ‘sharply reduce the number of unjusti-
fied claims’ because ‘many claimants who have unfortunately not found a new job 
have time on their hands and view a free employment tribunal as a no cost option 
on winning an award’.20 Payment of Tribunal Awards compels caution in accepting 
such conclusions. Seventy-two of claimants were employed at the time research-
ers interviewed them (74% were employed at the time of launching their claim).21 
Fifty-eight percent of those who had been in work at the time of both launching a 
claim and interview for this study were earning a similar level to that made before 
the claim.22 Thirteen percent were working for the same employer at the time of 
their claim.23 In fact, only 7% of claimants had previously made a claim.24
B. representation of claimants
Payment of Tribunal Awards also indicated some level of support for the argument 
that Coalition employment regulation reforms also impacted worker-side lawyers.25 
Sixty-seven percent of claimants were likely to seek assistance for an unfair dis-
missal claim and 57% sought assistance from solicitors.26 For wage claims, claimants 
were more likely to access free advice through the Citizens Advice Bureau (30%) or 
Acas (12%).27 Overall, 42% of claimants had sought advice from legal professionals. 
Two other findings suggested an emerging concern. Twenty-five percent of claim-
ants sought advice from the Citizens’ Advice Bureau, while 19% used family and 
friends’ assistance. The prospect for self-representation seems greater given these 
20 A. Beecroft, Report on Employment Law (2011) 7 at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/
employment-matters/docs/r/12-825-report-on-employment-law-beecroft.pdf (last accessed 25 
February 2014). 
21 Payment of Tribunal Awards: 15. Fifty-eight percent were in full-time and 26% in part-time 
work: Ibid. 17.
22 Ibid. 16. Eighteen percent were making more than they previously did. However, an equal 
proportion was earning less.
23 Payment of Tribunal Awards, 17.
24 Ibid. 19.
25 D. Mangan, ‘Employment Tribunal Procedure Reforms to Boost the Economy’ (2013) 42 
ILJ 409–21, at p 417.
26 Payment of Tribunal Awards, 26.
27 Ibid. 25.
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figures.28 Self-representation also means greater demands on resources dependent 
on government funding which as yet do not seem to be increasing in concert with 
any foreseeable increase in use. More profoundly, there is notable potential for the 
spread of misinformation. This may perhaps be the most troubling aspect because an 
absence of knowledge is a surmountable predicament. There should be discomfort 
when reading this part of the study when one considers that IFF found those who 
received assistance from lawyers, unions or informal arrangements ‘either before, 
during or after their initial hearing were more likely to receive payment without 
needing enforcement (58%)’.29
4. reform PremISeS SuPPorted By dAtA
The prospects for small- to medium-sized employers emerged as a particular concern in 
reforms encapsulated in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. This focus was 
vindicated by the IFF study. While 59% of employers in the private sector are small- to 
medium-sized businesses,30 68% of claims were made against this cohort: 33% of claim-
ants filed cases against employers with 1-9 employees; 35% against employers employ-
ing between 10 and 49 workers; 11% against undertakings with 50–249 workers.31
5. ImPAct of emPLoyment reguLAtIon
Since the last survey of this kind in 2008, there has been a marked decline in unfair 
dismissal claims: 50% in 2008 down to 38% in 2013. The Unfair Dismissal and 
Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 2012 
(SI 2012/989), which doubled the qualification period for unfair dismissal from 1 to 
2 years, may have contributed to the decline. The IFF study, as noted above, looked 
at claims between September 2011 and November 2012. The Order came into effect 
on 6 April 2012 which may have resulted in an increase in the number of claims just 
prior to this date (an occurrence witnessed just before the 29 July 2013 coming into 
force date of the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees 
Order 2013 (SI 2013/1893)). The decline may be more significant given the possibil-
ity of an increase. Ewing and Hendy have questioned the reason for the increase 
28 Mr. Justice Langstaff, President of the Employment Appeals Tribunal, has predicted such 
an increase: Senior President Report, 64.
29 Ibid. 6.
30 BIS, Business Population Estimates for the UK and Regions (London: Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013).
31 Payment of Tribunal Awards, 20.
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in the qualification period.32 The Dismissal Order remains significant because it 
confirms the impact of employment regulation on the number of claims made. The 
noted decrease in unfair dismissal claims may foreshadow a similar drop in the over-
all number of claims with respect to the influence of the Tribunal Fees Order.33
DAV I D   M A N GA N
University of Leicester, School of Law
david.mangan@le.ac.uk doi:10.1093/indlaw/dwu011
32 Ewing and Hendy, 116.
33 Mr. Justice Langstaff has identified a drop in applications of one-third in his 2014 report: 
Senior President Report, 63.
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